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Abstract— We consider the problem of engineering robust
direct perception neural networks with output being regression.
Such networks take high dimensional input image data, and
they produce affordances such as the curvature of the upcoming
road segment or the distance to the front vehicle. Our proposal
starts by allowing a neural network prediction to deviate from
the label with tolerance ∆. The source of tolerance can be
either contractual or from limiting factors where two entities
may label the same data with slightly different numerical values.
The tolerance motivates the use of a non-standard loss function
where the loss is set to 0 so long as the prediction-to-label
distance is less than ∆. We further extend the loss function
and define a new provably robust criterion that is parametric
to the allowed output tolerance ∆, the layer index l˜ where
perturbation is considered, and the maximum perturbation
amount κ. During training, the robust loss is computed by first
propagating symbolic errors from the l˜-th layer (with quantity
bounded by κ) to the output layer, followed by computing the
overflow between the error bounds and the allowed tolerance.
The overall concept is experimented in engineering a direct per-
ception neural network for understanding the central position
of the ego-lane in pixel coordinates.
I. INTRODUCTION
Deep neural networks (DNNs) are increasingly used in
the automotive industry for realizing perception functions in
automated driving. The safety-critical nature of automated
driving requires the deployed DNNs to be highly dependable.
Among many dependability attributes we consider the robust-
ness criterion, which intuitively requires a neural network
to produce similar output values under similar inputs. It is
known that DNNs trained under standard approaches can
be difficult to exhibit robustness. For example, by imposing
carefully crafted tiny noise on an input data point, the newly
generated data point may enable a DNN to produce results
that completely deviate from the originally expected output.
In this paper, we study the robustness problem for direct
perception networks in automated driving. The concept of
direct perception neural networks refers to learning affor-
dances (high-level sensory features) [1]–[3] such as dis-
tance to lane markings or distance to the front vehicles,
directly from high-dimensional sensory inputs. In contrast
to classification where the output criterion for robustness is
merely the sameness of the output label for input data under
perturbation, direct perception commonly uses regression
output. For practical systems, it can be unrealistic to assume
that trained neural networks can produce output regression
that perfectly matches the numerical values as specified in
the labels.
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Towards this issue, our proposal is to define tolerance ∆
that explicitly regulates the allowed output deviation from
labels. Pragmatically, the source of tolerance arises from two
aspects, namely (i) the quality contract between car makers
and their suppliers, or (ii) the inherent uncertainty in the
manual labelling process1. We subsequently define a loss
function that integrates the tolerance - the prediction error
is set to be 0 so long as the prediction falls within the
tolerance bound. Thus the training intuitively emphasizes
reducing the worst case (i.e., to bring the prediction back
to the tolerance). This is in contract to the use of standard
loss functions (such as mean-squared-error) where the goal
is to bring every prediction to be close to the label.
As robustness requires that input data being perturbed
should produce results similar to input data without pertur-
bation, ∆ can naturally be overloaded to define the “same-
ness” of the regression output under perturbation. Based
on this concept, we further propose a new criterion for
provable robustness [4]–[10] tailored for regression, which
is parametric to the allowed output tolerance ∆, the layer
index l˜ where perturbation is considered, and the maximum
perturbation amount κ. The robust criterion requires that
for any data point in the training set, by applying any
feature-level perturbation on the l-th layer with quantity less
than κ, the computation of the DNN only leads to slight
output deviation (bounded by ∆) from the associated ground
truth. Importantly, the introduction of parameter l˜ overcomes
scalability and precision issues, while it also implicitly
provides capabilities to capture global input transformations
(cf. Section V for a detailed comparison to existing work). By
carefully defining the loss function as the interval overflow
between (i) the computed error bounds due to perturbation
and (ii) the allowed tolerance interval, the loss can be
efficiently computed by summing the overflow of two end-
points in the propagated symbolic interval.
To evaluate our proposed approach, we have trained a
direct perception network with labels created from publicly
accessible datasets. The network takes input from road
images and produces affordances such as the central position
of the ego-lane in pixel coordinates. The positive result of
our preliminary experiment demonstrates the potential for
further applying the technology in other automated driving
tasks that use DNNs.
(Structure of the Paper) The rest of the paper is struc-
1Our very preliminary experiments demonstrated that, when trying to
label the center of the ego lane on the same image having 1280 pixels
in width, a labelling deviation of 10 pixels for two consecutive trials is
very common, especially when the labelling decision needs to be conducted
within a short period of time.
ar
X
iv
:1
90
9.
13
60
0v
1 
 [c
s.L
G]
  3
0 S
ep
 20
19
lbj lbj + ∆jlbj −∆j
f
(L)
j (in)
lbj lbj + ∆jlbj −∆j
f
(L)
j (in)
e∆j = 0 e
∆
j = f
(L)
j (in)− (lbj + ∆j)
(a) (b)
Fig. 1: Illustrating the error defined by ∆j .
tured as follows. Section II starts with basic formulations
of neural networks and describes the tolerance concept. It
subsequently details how the error between predictions and
labels, while considering tolerance, can be implemented with
GPU support. Section III extends the concept of tolerance
for provable robustness by considering feature-level pertur-
bation. Section IV details our initial experiment in a highway
vision-based perception system. Finally, we outline related
work in Section V and conclude the paper in Section VI
with future directions.
II. NEURAL NETWORK AND TOLERANCE
A neural network N is comprised of L layers where
operationally, the l-th layer for l ∈ {1, . . . , L} of the network
is a function g(l) ∶ Rdl−1 → Rdl , with dl being the dimension
of layer l. Given an input data point in ∈ Rd0 , the output
of the l-th layer of the neural network f (l) is given by
the functional composition of the l-th layer and previous
layers f (l)(in) ∶= ○(l)i=1g(i)(in) = g(l)(. . . g(2)(g(1)(in))).
f (L)(in) is the prediction of the network under input data
point in. Throughout this paper, we use subscripts to extract
an element in a vector, e.g., use inj to denote the j-th value
of in.
Given a neural network N following above definitions,
let Dtrain ∶= {(in, lb)} be the training data set, with each
data point in ∈ Rd0 having its associated label lb ∈ RdL . Let(∆1, . . . ,∆dL), where ∀j ∈ {1, . . . , dL} ∶ ∆j ≥ 0, be the
output tolerance. We integrate tolerance to define the error
between a prediction f (L)(in) of the neural network and the
label lb. Precisely, for output index j ∈ {1, . . . , dL},
e∆j (f (L)j (in), lbj) ∶=
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
0 if ∣f (L)j (in) − lbj ∣ ≤ ∆j
min(∣f (L)j (in) − (lbj −∆j)∣,∣f (L)j (in) − (lbj +∆j)∣) otherwise
(1)
Figure 1 illustrates the intuition of such an error definition.
We consider a prediction to be correct (i.e., error to be 0)
when the prediction is within interval [lbj − ∆j , lbj + ∆j]
(Figure 1-a). Otherwise, the error is the distance to the
boundary of the interval (Figure 1-b). Finally, we define
the in-sample error to be the sum of squared error for each
output dimension, for each data point in the training set.
Definition 1 (Interval tolerance loss): Define the error in
the training set (i.e., in-sample error) to be E∆train ∶=
1
N ∑(in,lb)∈Dtrain(E(in, lb)), where N = ∣Dtrain∣ and
E(in, lb) = ∑dLj=1(e∆j (f (L)j (in), lbj))2 .
One may observe that the loss function defined above is
designed as an extension of the mean-squared-error (MSE)
loss function.
Lemma 1: When ∀j ∈ {1, . . . , L} ∶ ∆j = 0,
E∆train is equal to the mean-squared-error loss function
1
N ∑(in,lb)∈Dtrain ∣∣f (L)(in) − lb ∣∣2.
Proof: By setting ∆j = 0, e∆j (f (L)j (in), lbj) can be
simplified to ∣f (L)j (in)− lbj ∣. Thus, in Definition 1, E(in, lb)
is simplified to ∑dLj=1 ∣f (L)j (in)− lbj ∣2, which is equivalent to
computing the square of the L2-norm ∣∣f (L)(in) − lb ∣∣2.
(Implementing the loss function with GPU support) For
commonly seen machine learning infrastructures such as
TensorFlow2 or PyTorch3, for training a neural network
that uses standard layers such as ReLU [11], ELU [12],
Leaky ReLU [13] as well as convolution, one only needs
to manually implement the customized loss function, while
back propagation capabilities for parameter updates are au-
tomatically created by the infrastructure. In the following,
we demonstrate a rewriting of e∆j () such that it uses built-in
primitives supported by TensorFlow. Such a rewriting makes
it possible for the training to utilize GPU parallelization.
Lemma 2 (Error function using GPU function primitives):
Let clip≥0(x) be a function that returns x if x ≥ 0;
otherwise it returns 0. Define eˆ∆j (f (L)j (in), lbj) to be
max(clip≥0((lbj −∆j)− f (L)j (in)),clip≥0(f (L)j (in)− (lbj +
∆j))). Then e∆j (f (L)j (in), lbj) = eˆ∆j (f (L)j (in), lbj).
Proof: (Sketch) It can be intriguing to reason that
eˆ∆j () and e∆j () are equivalent functions, i.e., the if-then-
else statement in e∆j () is implicitly implemented using the
clip≥0 primitive4 in eˆ∆j (). To assist understanding, Figure 2
provides a simplified proof by enumerating all three possible
cases regarding the relative position of f (L)j (in) and the
tolerance interval, together with their intermediate compu-
tations. Diligent readers can easily swap the constants in
Figure 2 and establish a formal correctness proof.
III. PROVABLY ROBUST TRAINING
This section starts by outlining the concept of feature-
level perturbation, followed by defining symbolic loss. It
then defines provably robust training and how training can be
made efficient with GPU support. For simplifying notations,
in this section let v ⊕ c be an operation that (1) if c is a
scalar, adds c to every dimension of a vector v, or (2) if c
is a vector, perform element-wise addition.
Definition 2 (Output bound under (l˜, κ)-perturbation):
Given a neural network N and an input data point in, let
2Google TensorFlow: http://www.tensorflow.org
3Facebook PyTorch: https://www.pytorch.org
4The clip≥0() function is implemented in Google TensorFlow using
tf.keras.backend.clip.
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Fig. 2: Illustrating the output equivalence between functions
e∆j () and eˆ∆j () using examples.
[L,U] be the output bound subject to (l˜, κ)-perturbation.
For each output dimension j ∈ {1, . . . , dL}, [Lj , Uj], the
j-th output bound of the neural network, satisfies the
following condition: If oj = g(L)j (g(L−1)(. . . (g(l˜)(fv))))
where fv ∈ [f (l˜−1)(in) ⊕ −κ, f (l˜−1)(in) ⊕ κ], then
oj ∈ [Lj , Uj].
Definition 2 can be understood operationally: first compute
f (l˜−1)(in) which is the feature vector of in at layer l˜.
Subsequently, try to perturb f (l˜−1)(in) with some noise
bounded by [−κ,κ] in each dimension, in order to cre-
ate a perturbed feature vector fv. Finally, continue with
the computation using the perturbed feature vector (i.e.,
g(L)(g(L−1)(. . . (g(l˜)(fv))))), and the computed prediction
in the j-th dimension should be bounded by [Lj , Uj]. Note
that Definition 2 only requires [Lj , Uj] to be an over-
approximation over the set of all possible predicted values, as
the logical implication is not bidirectional. The bound can be
computed efficiently with GPU support via approaches such
as abstract interpretation with boxed domain (i.e., dataflow
analysis [14], [15]).
Given the output bound under (l˜, κ)-perturbation, our goal
is to define a loss function that computes the overflow of
output bounds over the range of tolerant values.
Definition 3 (Symbolic loss): For the j-th output of the
neural network, for (in, lb) ∈ Dtrain, Let [L,U] be the
output bound by feeding the network with in following
Definition 2. Define e⟨∆,l˜,κ⟩j ([L,U], lb), the symbolic loss
for the j-th output subject to (l˜, κ)-perturbation with ∆ tol-
erance, to be overflow([Lj , Uj], [lbj−∆j , lbj+∆j]). The
function overflow(I1, I2) equals ∑nm=1 dist( 12(Lαm +
Uαm), [lbj −∆j , lb +∆j]) where● [Lα1 , Uα1], . . . , [Lαn , Uαn] are maximally disjoint in-
tervals of I1 ∖ I2.● Function dist(A, [B,C]) computes the shortest dis-
tance between point A and points in the interval [B,C].
The intuition behind the defined symbolic loss is to (i)
compute the intervals of the output bound that are outside
the tolerance and subsequently, (ii) consider the loss as the
accumulated effort to bring the center of each interval back
to the tolerance interval. Figure 3 illustrates the concept.
● In Figure 3-a, as the both the output lower-bound and
the upper-bound are contained in the tolerance interval,
the loss is set to 0.● For Figure 3-d, the output bound is [−2,5.5] while
the tolerance interval is [−1,4]. Therefore, there are
two maximally disjoint intervals [−2,−1] and [4,5.5]
falling outside the tolerance. The loss is the distance
between the center of each interval [−2,−1], [4,5.5] to
the tolerance boundary, which equals ∣ 1
2
(5.5 + 4) − 4∣ +∣ 1
2
(−2 + (−1)) − (−1)∣ = 1.25.● Lastly in Figure 3-e, the complete interval [5.5,9] is
outside the tolerance interval. The loss is the distance
between the center of the interval ( 5.5+9
2
) to the bound-
ary, which equals 5.5+9
2
− 4 = 3.25.
Definition 4 (Symbolic tolerance loss): Given a neural
network N , define the loss on the training set Dtrain to be
E
(∆,l˜,κ)
train = 1N ∑(in,lb)∈Dtrain(E(in, lb)), where E(in, lb) =∑dLj=1(e(∆,l˜,κ)j ([L,U], lb))2, N = ∣Dtrain∣, and [L,U] is
computed using Definition 2.
(Implementing the loss function with GPU support) The
following result states that computing the symbolic loss on
the j-th output can be done very effectively by averaging the
interval loss for Lj and Uj , thereby further utilizing the result
from Lemma 2 for efficient computation via GPU support.
Lemma 3 (Computing symbolic loss by taking end-points):
For the j-th output of the neural network, for(in, lb) ∈ Dtrain, the symbolic loss subject to (l˜, κ)-
perturbation with ∆ tolerance has the following property:
e
⟨∆,l˜,κ⟩
j ([L,U], lb) = 12(e∆j (Lj , lbj) + e∆j (Uj , lbj))
where [L,U] is computed by feeding the network with in
using Definition 2.
Proof: (Sketch) Here for simplicity, we illustrate in
Figure 3 all 6 possible cases concerning the relative position
between interval [Lj , Uj] and interval [lbj−∆j , lbj+∆j]. For
each case, results of computing 1
2
(e∆j (Lj , lbj)+e∆j (Uj , lbj))
are shown directly in Figure 3. Readers can easily swap the
constants in Figure 3 to create a formal correctness proof.
One immediate observation of Lemma 3 is that when
the maximum allowed perturbation κ equals 0, no feature
perturbation appears, and the output bound can be as tight as
a single point f (L)(in). Therefore, one has L = U = f (L)(in)
and it enables the following simplification.
Lemma 4: When κ = 0, values computed using symbolic
loss can be the same as values computed from interval loss,
i.e., e⟨∆,l˜,κ⟩j ([L,U], lb) = e∆j (f (L)j (in), lbj).
Results from Lemma 1, 3 and 4 altogether offer a prag-
matic method for training. First, one can train a network
using the loss function MSE; based on the chained rule of
Lemma 1 and Lemma 3, using MSE loss is equivalent to
the special case where ∆ = 0 and κ = 0. Subsequently, one
can train the network with interval loss; it is equivalent to
(a) (b)
Tolerance bound [lbj −∆j , lbj + ∆j ]
Output bound [Lj , Uj ]
−1 4
e
〈∆,l˜,κ〉
j ([L,U ], lb) = 0
−1 4
e
〈∆,l˜,κ〉
j ([L,U ], lb) =
1
2 (1.5) = 0.75
5.5
(c) (d)
−1 4
e
〈∆,l˜,κ〉
j ([L,U ], lb) =
1
2 (1) = 0.5
−1 4
e
〈∆,l˜,κ〉
j ([L,U ], lb) =
1
2 (1.5 + 1) = 1.25
5.5−2−2
(e)
−1 4
e
〈∆,l˜,κ〉
j ([L,U ], lb) =
1
2 (1.5 + 5) = 3.25
5.5 9
(f)
−1 4
e
〈∆,l˜,κ〉
j ([L,U ], lb) =
1
2 (1 + 3) = 2
−2−4
Fig. 3: Computing symbolic interval loss
the special case where κ = 0. Finally, one enlarges the value
of κ towards provably robust training.
Finally, we summarize the theoretical guarantee that the
new training approach provides. Intuitively, the below lemma
states that if there exists an input in′ (not necessarily con-
tained in the training data) whose feature vector is suffi-
ciently close to the feature vector of an existing input in,
then the output of the network under in′ will be close to the
output of the network under in.
Lemma 5 (Theoretical guarantee on provable training):
Given a neural network N and Dtrain ∶= {(in, lb)} be
the training data set, if E(∆,l˜,κ)train = 0, then for every input
in’, if exists an input training data (in, lb) ∈ Dtrain such
that f (l˜−1)(in’) ∈ [f (l˜−1)(in) ⊕ (−κ), f (l˜−1)(in) ⊕ +κ], then
f (L)(in’) ∈ [lb⊕ (−∆), lb⊕∆].
Proof: When E(∆,l˜,κ)train = 0, from Definition 4 one knows
that for every input data (in, lb) ∈ Dtrain, the corresponding
e
(∆,l˜,κ)
j ([L,U], lb) = 0. This implies that the output lower-
bound Lj and upper-bound Uj , computed using Definition 3
with input in, are contained in [lbj −∆j , lbj +∆j].
In Definition 3, the computation of Lj and Uj considers
every point in [f (l˜−1)(in)⊕(−κ), f (l˜−1)(in)⊕+κ]. Therefore,
so long as f (l˜−1)(in’) ∈ [f (l˜−1)(in)⊕ (−κ), f (l˜−1)(in)⊕+κ],
the output of the neural network under in’ should be within[L,U], thereby within [lb⊕ (−∆), lb⊕∆].
As a consequence, if one perturbs a data point in in the
training set to in′, so long as the perturbed input has produced
similar high-level feature vectors at layer l˜ − 1, the output
under perturbation is provably guaranteed to fall into the
tolerance interval.
IV. EXPERIMENT
To understand the proposed concept in a realistic setup,
we engineered a direct perception network for identifying
the center of the ego lane in x-position, by considering a
fixed height (y = 500) in pixel coordinates5. For repeatability
purposes, we take the publicly available TuSimple dataset for
lane detection6 and create labels from its associated ground
truth.
A. Creating data for experimenting direct perception
In the TuSimple lane detection dataset, labels for lane
markings contain three parts:
● Ly containing a list of y coordinates that are used to
represent a lane.● A list of lanes L1,L2 . . ., where for each lane Li, it
stores a list of x coordinates.● The corresponding image raw file.
Therefore, for the i-th lane in an image, its lane markings are(Li[0], Ly[0]), (Li[1], Ly[1]), (Li[2], Ly[2]), and so on.
The lanes are mostly ordered from left to right, with some
exceptions (e.g., files clips/0313-1/21180/20.jpg
and clips/0313-2/550/20.jpg) where one needs to
manually reorder the lanes.
We created a script to automatically generate affordance
labels for our experiment: First, fix the height to be 500,
followed by finding two adjacent lanes where (1) the first
lane marking is on the left side of the image, and (2) the
second lane marking is on the right side. If the script cannot
find such two lanes, and the script just omits the data as it
requires manual labelling. Subsequently, we take the average
x-position of two such lanes to be the center of the ego lane
(i.e., the label). Therefore, every output label is an integer
between 0 and 720. See Figure 4 for the ground truth of the
lane marking and the generated center-of-ego-lane position
(small green dot). Furthermore, we duplicate images whose
created labels are far (≥ 100 pixels) from the center of the
image, to highlight the importance of rare events and to
compensate the problem of not having enough labelled data.
For an image in the TuSimple dataset, it has a size of
1280 × 720. We crop the y-direction to keep only pixels
with indices in range [208,720), as the cropped elements are
largely sky and cloud. Subsequently, resize the image by 1
4
and make it grayscale. This ultimately creates, for each input
image, a tensor of dimension 320×128×1 (in TensorFlow, the
shape of the tensor equals (128,320,1)). We also perform
simple normalization using t(v) = 2
255
v − 1 such that the
value v of each pixel, originally in the range [0,255], is
now in the interval [−1,1].
B. Evaluation
In our experiment, we use a network architecture similar
to the one shown in Figure 5. As a baseline, we train 20
networks using Xavier weight initialization [16], with each
5It is possible to train a network to produce multiple affordances.
Nevertheless, in the evaluation, our decision to only produce one affordance
is to clearly understand the impact of the methodology for robustness.
6TuSimple data set is available at: https://github.com/
TuSimple/tusimple-benchmark/wiki
Fig. 4: Creating labels for the center of the ego-lane (green
dot), from labels of lane markings (lines in the images) in
the TuSimple data set.
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Fig. 5: The network architecture used in evaluation.
network starting with a unique random seed between 0
and 19. This is for repeatability purposes (via fixing random
seeds) and for eliminating manual knowledge bias in summa-
rizing our findings (via training many models). The training
uses the Adaptive Moment Estimation (Adam) optimization
algorithm [17] with learning rate α = 0.01 for 20 epochs and
subsequently, α = 0.001 for another 10 epochs. Finally, we
take the best 6 performed models and further apply robust
training techniques, by using Adam optimization algorithm
with α = 0.001 for yet another 10 epochs. In terms of
average-case performance, the baseline model and the model
further trained with robust loss have similar performance.
We use the single-step (non-iterative) fast gradient sign
method (FGSM) [18] as the baseline perturbation technique
to understand the effect of applying robust training. Precisely,
we compare the minimum step size  to make an originally
perfect prediction (both for the standard network and the
network further trained using robust loss) deviate with 80
pixels. As we use the single-step method, the parameter 
is directly related to the intensity of perturbation. Figure 6
shows the overall summary on each baseline model and
its further (robustly) trained model. In some models (such
as model 2), further training does not lead to significant
improvement, as for these networks, the minimum  values
for enabling successful perturbations are largely similar.
Nevertheless, for other models such as model 1 or model 6,
a huge portion of the images require larger  in the robustly
trained model, in order to successfully create the adversarial
effect. Figure 7 details the required  value for successful
attacks in model 1, where each image is a point in the
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Fig. 7: Comparing models trained using standard (MSE) and
symbolic loss approaches (for applying ∆ = 10 and κ = 0.01
on the layer fc40 of Figure 5).
coordinate plane. One immediately observes that the majority
of the points are located at the top-left of the coordinate
plane, i.e., one requires larger amount of perturbation for
models under robust training to reach the desired effect.
Although our initial evaluation has hinted promises, it is
important to understand that a more systematic analysis, such
as evaluating the technique on multiple data sets and a deeper
understanding over the parameter space of ∆, κ, and l˜, is
needed to make the technology truly useful.
V. RELATED WORK
For engineering robust neural networks, the concept in
this paper is highly related to the work of provably ro-
bust training [4]–[10]. Compared to existing work, the key
difference lies in two aspects: (i) Existing work focuses
on classification, while we focus on output regression for
learning affordances. This is made possible by considering an
afore-specified tolerance interval. (ii) Existing work perturbs
directly on the individual input channels (which is a special
case of ours by setting l˜ = 1), while our definition of
layer index l˜ generally applies to close-to-output layers. This
implies a feature-level perturbation rather than perturbation
on individual bits (which makes existing methods hard to
characterize global transformation such as image distortion).
It also increases size of the network that can be trained:
As symbolic bound propagation starts at the l˜-th layer, the
execution time and the precision for bound propagation is
indifferent to the depth of convolution layers before feature
layers. In this work, we only use the boxed domain to com-
pute the over-approximation, following the work of [15]. One
can also use more precise abstract-interpretation domains
such as Zonotope [19] with a price of increasing the training
time, but pragmatically (due to the loss never approaching 0)
the imprecision of boxed domain can be compensated by
simply using smaller κ values.
The concept of provable robustness training by definition
only establishes a proof on every data point used in training.
Therefore, even for perfectly trained neural networks, it is
still insufficient to argue quality assurance on data points in
the Operating Design Domain (ODD) that are distant from
the training data. It may be complemented by recent research
attempts in testing, formal verification, or the introduction
of systematic processes for dependable machine learning.
Testing techniques, as demonstrated in recent research trend
of finding adversarial examples (due to excessive results in
this direction, we refer readers to a recent survey paper [20]
for existing approaches), largely use gradient-based search
techniques to find small perturbation around original inputs
that makes the output of neural network behave erroneously.
It focuses on finding counter-examples rather than providing
a guaranteed proof for the absence of undesired behav-
ior. Some recently proposed test metrics aim to provide
a pragmatic argument of completeness of testing [21]–
[24] mimicking the coverage criteria (e.g., line coverage)
appeared in classical software testing techniques. Formal
verification [15], [19], [25]–[38] views the neural network as
a mathematical object and performs symbolic analysis either
via SMT [26], [28], abstract interpretation [19], [25], [33],
[36], MILP [15], [29], or specialized search techniques [27],
[30]–[32], [34], [35]. Overall, formal verification offers
strong promise on the absence undesired behaviors, but the
scalability to very deep networks with inputs from high-
dimensional pixel images remains limited.
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper, we considered the problem of engineer-
ing robust networks for direct perception, where regression
rather than classification is used for output. We defined a
loss function by integrating the practically-driven tolerance
concept, thereby guiding the training process with the goal
of bringing predictions back to the tolerance interval rather
than a stricter form of being close to labels. Extending the
tolerance concept by integrating perturbation, we created
conditions where one can ascertain robustness with provably
guarantees. The proposed loss functions are proven to be
generalizations of the MSE loss function commonly used in
standard training approaches.
The inability to create a systematic approach for engineer-
ing robust neural networks for perception systems is one of
the most critical barriers towards safe automated driving. We
believe that the approach suggested in this paper, in particular
the tolerance-driven approach for machine learning, offers an
initial step towards a rigorous and contract-driven method-
ology for the use of machine learning in the automotive
domain. This is largely due to the alignment between the
tolerance as regulated in the contract (specification) and the
corresponding tolerance-integrated loss function (architecture
design). Although the work is motivated by concrete prob-
lems in direct perception, the underlying technique can be
applicable to other applications in automated driving where
regression is used.
For future work, we plan to apply similar concepts to other
domains such as medical diagnosis, as well as developing
analogous concepts for recurrent neural networks. Within
the automotive domain, we also plan to bring our proposed
contract-based approach for machine learning to standardiza-
tion bodies, with the goal of revising existing autonomous
driving safety standards such as ISO 214487.
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